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ABSTRACT: Climate change is quickly becoming one of the biggest threats faced by the
international community and has the capacity to greatly impact global security. The relationship
between climate change and conflict is still unraveling; however, worsening climatic events have
contributed to political instability around the world. As climate change implications become more
apparent, water is less abundant due to worsening droughts and less precipitation, allowing it to
become a target for groups seeking to control territory or populations. This paper examines the
impact of climate change in shifting the power dynamic between states and violent non-state actors
within their borders. More specifically, focusing on the use of water weaponization by the Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq and Syria shows the
ability of water resources to be manipulated in a water scarce and politically unstable environment
to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. This research creates a chronology of water
weaponization to track acts of water weaponization by ISIL from 2012, as they gained power in
Iraq and Syria, until 2019 following the ‘defeat’ of their caliphate. Succeeding the chronology, acts
of water weaponization are tracked using the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary maps
and Situation Reports to find the connection between acts of water weaponization and the strength
of their caliphate through territory held. Through identifying fourteen water weaponization acts by
ISIL from 2012-2019, a connection is found between the acquisition of a water resource, or an
attack weaponizing water, and the territorial shifts of the caliphate over time. In doing so, this
research hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between climate change
and conflict connected to future security and counterterrorism measures to combat climate related
threats.

Introduction
As the effects of climate change become more visible, there is intensifying discussion of the nexus
between climate change and conflict. In 2014, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
dedicated a report, the first of its kind, addressing the human security dimensions of climate
change.1 Increased droughts in arid and semi-arid regions are one of the most frequent ways in
which climate change might increase conflict, one of the most affected regions being the Middle
East.2 The Middle East has experienced ten out of twelve of its’ driest winters since 1902 within
the last 20 years, with climate change being one of the key factors for this increase in drying. 3 In
relation to this prediction, this research seeks to explore the connection between climate change
and conflict in the Middle East.
The drought between 2006 and 2010 in the Levant region was a major factor in the 2011
uprising in Syria.4 It was estimated that 1.3 million Syrians experienced or were affected by
agricultural failures due to the drought. 5 Wheat and barley prices dropped 47% and 67%
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respectively and approximately 800,000 inhabitants lost their livelihoods.6 This major agricultural
failure led to a widespread migration of up to 1.5 million Syrians from rural to urban centers. 7 In
September 2008, the first UN drought appeal claimed that migration from rural areas during 2007
and 2008 was 20 to 30% higher than during previous years.8 A subsequent UN report estimated
the drought migration at 65,000 families in that time period, although a UN Special Reporter once
claimed 600,000 people had emigrated. 9 De Châtel (2014) notes that the Northeast region of Syria
had been declining since 2000 due to the agricultural practice shifts and mismanagement of water
and land resources; however, continued mishandling of climatic events and a weak socio-political
atmosphere exacerbated existing instability.
Water management in Iraq has been poor throughout continued conflicts in the past
decades. The first and second Gulf wars led to a major breakdown of an already crumbling water
management system. 10 The 2006-2010 drought interacted with the poor socio-economic system
following the geopolitical upheavals in Iraq following the Gulf wars and the 2003 US invasion and
continued insurgency.11 Namely, the drought intensified grievances and stress on the Iraqi society
through the effects of migration and agricultural losses (King, 2015). Between 2008 and 2009,
Iraqi crop yields plummeted 45% leading to a sharp increase in food prices and food insecurity.12
This event led to over 10,000 farmers abandoning their fields along the Euphrates to emigrate to
already struggling urban centers, which increased tensions with the Iraqi government who failed
to provide adequate services. 13 These conditions allowed the Syrian conflict to spill across the
border into North-Western Iraq.14
In areas where climate disasters weakened central government authority, new areas opened
that not only provided a safe haven to violent non-state terror actors, but also served as an incubator
where these groups could increase their numbers and gain momentum. 15 The Northern provinces
of Syria, which produced two-thirds of Syria’s crop yields, were some of the most impacted by the
drought.16 These same regions are the ones that ISIL has maintained steady control of since the
beginning of the conflict. 17 Due to the political instability in Iraq and Syria, exacerbated by the
drought and weak water management systems, dams overwhelmingly became a focal point of
struggle, and a weapon in war.18 ISIL captured strategic natural resources and weaponized them
to accomplish political, economic, and military aims. 19 It is these actions that showcase ISIL’s goal
of establishing a caliphate that intends to assume many of the attributes of statehood, including
control of territory and providing municipal services to its population. Through apprehending
water resources or manipulating them to control the local population, ISIL shifts the power
dynamic away from the established state by decreasing state sovereignty and maintaining control
over key resources such as food, water, energy and employment.
This paper first explores the existing literature on the relationship between climate change
and conflict, water weaponization and the weakening of nation-states. In order to explore the
connections between these concepts, a water weaponization chronology of fourteen water
weaponization acts by ISIL is produced, along with subsequent state actions against these acts,
from November 2012 through June 2018 using information from a variety of news sources, the
Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site and the Global Terrorism Database. Following the
chronology, the Institute for the Study of War’s ISIS Sanctuary Maps and Campaign Tracker are
utilized to map these water weaponization acts coinciding with the caliphate’s territorial activity
in Iraq and Syria until March 2019 with the announcement of the caliphate’s defeat. The analysis
of the chronology and territorial shifts shows a connection between the acquisition of water
resources or manipulation of water with the gaining and loss of territory by ISIL over this time
period.
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Literature Review
The weakening of the nation-state as the primary security actor has caused great concern among
the international community. Recent technological, economic, and social developments have
posed serious challenges to the capacity of a nation to fulfill their traditional functions of security,
welfare, and identity, which has allowed for a greater playing field for violent non-state actors
(VNSAs) including terror organizations.20,21 A report by the US National Intelligence Council
explains that challenges such as water shortages, poor water quality, and floods increase the risk
of instability and state failure and elevate interstate tensions.22
Of increased interest is the degree to which climate change might exacerbate both water
insecurity and political instability, causing opportunity for these violent non-state actors. Climate
change is often classified as a ‘threat multiplier’, meaning that it triggers, accelerates and
intensifies current instabilities.23 Scholarly research has primarily explored the MENA region,
Africa and Southeast Asia. Climate change has enflamed water stress in these areas due to
increased droughts, less precipitation and natural disasters combined with weak governments and
powerful non-state combatants.24 When extreme poverty is exacerbated by climate threats and the
presence of terrorist organizations, climate change can expand the role and recruiting of these
organizations.25 Climate change impacts elicit the occupation of vital water infrastructure, or the
targeting of essential water sources, which make the local population rely on the occupying group
for vital resources.26 The developed world will be far better prepared to tackle the effects of climate
change compared to developing nations; therefore, the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries can potentially provide an opening for extremist ideologies and create the
conditions for terrorism.27 In relation to anticipated climate change effects, increased poverty and
reduced state capacity may contribute to the creation or preservation of functional space which
may allow terrorist groups to flourish.28 Of this discussion, the most frequently sought connection
between climate change and terrorism within these regions is through water.
In order to conceptualize water as a strategic resource utilized by these terror actors,
scholars studying water in security studies focus on water scarcity combined with other factors as
a determinant of intra-state conflict.29,30 Violent non-state actors such as terrorist organizations
pose a significant threat to nation-states as they are engaging states in “asymmetric wars,” in which
there are no rules to warfare enabling the expansion of tactics used. 31 For instance, under the 1977
Protocols to the Geneva Convention it is prohibited to “attack, destroy or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population”, including water. 32 While states must abide
by social norms of war including international law, non-state actors do not, which has increased
the direct targeting of strategic resources, such as water, to achieve their goals. 33
Some classify water weaponization in the concept of “hydro-terrorism.”34 VNSAs
destabilize governments through violent and coercive acts using resources like water as a target, a
weapon, a leveraging tool, and a nation-building strategy as well as a motive for violent response.35
King provides a detailed clarification on types of water weaponization used by these groups. In his
assessment of water weaponization, King defines strategic, tactical, psychological terrorism,
extortion or incentivization, and unintentional weaponization.36 He outlines strategic
weaponization as “the use of water to virtually or actually control large or important land areas or
facilities to fulfill the vision of sovereignty, and…an asset to fund activities, such as administration
and weapons acquisition, of a ‘state.’”37 Tactical weaponization is primarily the “use of water as a
weapon on the battlefield in direct or instant support of military operations or against targets of
military value.”38 Psychological terrorism encompasses “creating fear among non-combatants or
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the denial of access or contamination of the water supply.” 39 Extortion or incentivization involves
the “use of the water weapon to establish credibility as a governing authority or to reward support
from the local population.”40 Lastly, unintentional weaponization describes when the “use of water
as a weapon causes collateral damage to civilians or the ecological environment.” 41 This
classification is the most detailed of water weaponization and is useful to separate the multiple
utilizations of this strategy.
Additional definitions are utilized to encompass the use of water weaponization. Von
Lossow (2016) describes weaponized water as “water resources directly used as an instrument of
war in order to achieve strategic political and tactical military goals through targeting the
population, addressing the opponent’s political leadership and confronting the opposing
military.”42 Von Lossow’s definition is an all-encompassing definition to describe the strategy
rather than separate the different types of weaponization and primarily combines King’s tactical
and strategic water weaponization classifications.43 Daoudy (2020) rather splits it into categories
including: domination and legitimacy, the control over resources and infrastructures; attack and
capture of large infrastructures (a military target and goal); cutting off water, intentional flooding
and defensive fortification (a military tool); and delivery or refusal of basic infrastructureproduced services (a tool of cooperation). This paper utilizes Daoudy’s (2020) definition as it is
primarily interested in the ways in which water weaponization is used to shift the power dynamic
between the nation-state and VNSAs and the four classifications seen in this definition are the
most aligned with the types of weaponization used by ISIL to accomplish this.
Water weaponization is also covered in the context of environmental terrorism– distinct
from ‘hydro-terrorism’. Gleick (2006) defines the term “environmental terrorism” as referring to
the “unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems with the intent to harm
individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social
objective.”44 Although environmental terrorism encompasses any environmental resources, water
is damaged by rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure,
harming local populations.45 For this research, the classification of acts of water weaponization is
not utilized; however, this discussion is useful to clarify the meaning of the term and how scholars
have previously identified these acts.
The degree to which water is able to be weaponized relies on its value to the state, which
makes regions of the world more prone to water scarcity exacerbated by climate change greater
targets. Von Lossow (2016) noted that the effect of water as a weapon depends on the regional
hydrological and political context. A resource is more strategically appealing and destructive based
on its potential impact in a specific environment. 46 Sofuoğlu et al. (2019) show support for a
general causal pattern between climate change and political instability within 16 countries, and
conflict in 15 countries, in the Middle East and North Africa region (out of 18 analyzed over the
time period of 1985-2016). In arid or semiarid regions like the Middle East and North Africa where
water is already scarce, combatants use water to provide robust leverage over their opposition as
a militarized target. 47 ISIL in Syria and Iraq has employed the most frequent use of water as a
strategic resource in gaining control of territory. 48 ISIL has distinguished itself from other terror
organizations through its vision of a caliphate that will assume many of the attributes of statehood,
including territorial dominance and provision of municipal services to its population. 49 Water is a
key component of this strategy through their ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but
also as a source of taxation, agriculture, and as a service usually provided by a state. 50
Alternative organizations employing these strategies that scholars have explored include
Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Although less
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central to their strategy, these groups have all used water as a strategic weapon. Succeeding
widespread regional droughts in 2011, Al Shabaab cut off liberated cities from their water sources,
forcing residents from cut-off cities to walk to nearby towns to fetch water, many of which Al
Shabaab controlled.51 Al Shabaab’s water weaponization was widely unsuccessful in its attempt
to gain legitimacy or hurt the Somali government forces; however, it led to widespread suffering
in the population and maintained their presence in the region during the ongoing civil war in
Somalia.52 Boko Haram was documented weaponizing the limited water resources in Nigeria,
strategically contaminating water sources such as streams and wells pursued by their enemy,
capitalizing on the unrest caused by the civil war from 2005-2010.53 Continued water stress and
intensification of both droughts and flooding in the region impeded the governance capacity of the
weak Nigerian government, which led to Boko Haram’s violent surge to create an Islamic caliphate
in 2010.54 In 2017, the Taliban blew up a dam constructed in the Kandahar province of
Afghanistan, a key irrigation resource to agricultural lands and its destruction sparked panic among
residents.55 Afghanistan is prone to drought and flooding, which have become more severe as
climate change impacts have progressed, causing less snow, earlier snow melting, and an extended,
hotter growing season. 56 Additionally, the national government of Afghanistan was not functional
for much of the past few decades meaning a lack of central governance over water infrastructure.57
These are additional examples in which states with weak central governments have been unable to
maintain authority to govern due to environmental crises, allowing VNSAs to manipulate water
resources as weapons.
As the above examples of countries in the Middle East and African regions imply the
vulnerability of states to both climate threats and terrorism hinges on their strength as a state. A
decrease in state authority often correlates with an increase in non-state terror organization
occurrence who can use strategic resources to their advantage. 58 The provision of goods is a key
measure indicating the difference between a weak state and a strong state. The state’s primary
function is to provide security meaning to prevent invasions, territorial loss and to eliminate
domestic threats or assaults on the national order and social norms. 59 Unlike strong states, failed
states cannot maintain their borders and may lose authority over sections of territory. 60 Climate
change has the capacity to contribute to reduced state capacity, state failure and economic troubles
fostering an enabling environment for non-state actor terrorist groups. 61 In the case of interceding
climatic disasters, the economic failure and pervasive neglect that is endemic to failed states leads
to recurring food shortages and widespread hunger furthering political instability and providing
increased access to VNSAs.62 VNSAs capitalize on the destabilization of weak borders and
reduced state capacity to provide key resources exacerbated by these climatic events.
The strength of a violent non-state actor is measured similarly to that of states. Oktav
(2017) uses characterizations of actorness, powerfulness and effectiveness to demonstrate the
measure. Actorness includes territoriality and geopolitical codes as well as community building,
specifically highlighting territorial control for administrative practices and enforcing the idea of
citizenship. Powerfulness comprises financial resources including territorial control and natural
resources as well as taxes and confiscations, additionally, recruitment and propaganda. Finally,
effectiveness encompasses regional engagements including regional territorial control and degree
of security threat as well as international engagements, legitimacy, level of autonomy and
counterterrorism actions by the international community. Oktav’s study using the Islamic State as
an example, highlights viewing territory not only as a shelter but also an opportunity to engage in
administrative aspects of proto-statehood and community-building practices, as well as its funding
through the extortion of the population within its territories through taxes, fees, and
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confiscations.63 These distinctions solidify the importance of territory to measure the influence of
these actors as an indicator of state-like behavior. As discussed previously, water is identified as a
key component of the ability to both maintain control and gain territory, but also as a source of
taxation, agriculture, and resources provided by the state. 64
The connection between the identified weakness and failure of states and the advancement
of violent non-state actors is of vital importance to examine the role of water in these conflicts.
Through the capitalization of state weakness, substate actors gain control over areas within the
state, build up their own local security mechanisms, authorized markets, and can even establish
attempted forms of international relations.65 VNSAs have particular power in contexts where
governments demonstrate a lack of capacity to provide the goods commonly associated with
statehood such as security, infrastructure, and other basic welfare services, such as in the Middle
East and North Africa region suffering from civil wars and continued unrest. 66 Organizations can
leverage their armed capacity to capture and monopolize access to state-sponsored services;
specifically, previously existing infrastructure, such as dams, to secure locally dominant status at
the expense of the state while avoiding costly and time-consuming investment in independent
welfare systems.67 This strategy ensures the dependency of the local population and demonstrates
that a militia is capable of running the state after the conflict.68
The existing literature is primarily concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy
rather than the tactic’s use in the deterioration of state sovereignty in Iraq and Syria. Additionally,
while they focus on the beneficial use of the strategy in expanding ISIL’s caliphate, they neglect
the effect of the loss of these resources and the eventual defeat in March 2019. My research aims
to link the environmental issues caused by climate change with terrorism by showing how the
acquisition or manipulation of water resources illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the
state and VNSAs. In order to show the complete power shift, this paper will analyze not only the
attainment or manipulation of these resources, but the effects of their retrieval by the state in the
weakening of the caliphate to provide a full view of the influence of water weaponization to gain
legitimacy and power.
Research Design
The unstable conditions produced by the droughts in Iraq and Syria from 2006-2010 played a
meaningful relationship in the Syrian uprising and the ensuing spill over into Iraq, a weakness
capitalized upon by ISIL to set up their caliphate.69 Brewing grievances against the failing
governments and weakened civil institutions produced a safe haven for ISIL combatants and an
incubator to recruit and gain momentum. 70 In Syria, following the loss of livelihood and
environmental crisis, ISIL recruited 60 to 70% of its fighters locally; likewise, in Iraq, ISIL
recruited heavily from disgruntled Sunni Iraqis and prisoners released from Abu Ghraib Prison. 71
The maintenance of municipal service organizations, such as the Islamic Network for Public
Services, by ISIL provided electricity and transportation greatly supported by the dams captured
through water weaponizations, and was key to this recruitment. 72 For this reason, acts of water
weaponization are used, primarily the seizing of dams or use of water to control the local
population, to track ISIL’s rise to power and fall to defeat.
While other scholars have sought to identify acts of water weaponization to quantify the
links between climate change and terrorism, the previous studies were finalized before the socalled ‘defeat’ of the ISIL caliphate in March of 2019, which is of great importance in
understanding how water resources have contributed to their strength. Additionally, the previous
studies have been concerned with the exploration of ISIL’s water strategy rather than the strategy’s
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deterioration of state sovereignty. My research aims to link environmental issues caused by climate
change with terrorism by showing how the acquisition and manipulation of water resources
illustrates the shifting power dynamic between the state and VNSAs.
In order to do this, this paper explores the strategy of water weaponization by ISIL in the
creation of their caliphate in order to show the power shift from the nation state to the terror group.
To further explore this, this paper continues to analyze the decline of the caliphate with the loss of
these key water resources and the eventual defeat of the caliphate to further show the power shift
back to the nation state. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is used in this case study as their
use of water weaponization is the strongest identified utilization of this strategy and their
acquisition of territory to build a caliphate is transferable to tracking territorial power shifted to
the VNSA group from the state and vice versa.
A chronology of acts of water weaponization by ISIL throughout Iraq and Syria is produced
from 2012, as they build their caliphate, eventually announcing in June 2014, through March 2019
with the announcement of their defeat. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site, the Global
Terrorism Database, news sources, local government and UN reports are employed to locate the
acts of water weaponization. The Pacific Institute’s Water Chronology Site is a database tracking
and categorizing events related to water and conflict. Their database is coded by region, date,
category of conflict and includes sources confirming the event. The database is sorted through acts
coded as ‘triggers’, ‘weapons’, and ‘casualty’; however, this was not utilized in my research. When
the specific timeline of the event was unclear, this research utilized the Global Terrorism
Database’s incident reports to narrow the specific date.
This research corroborates these acts through newspapers and reports detailing the events.
When possible, using both Western 73 and regional news sources to detail the events in order to
verify accurate depictions of the events and obtain both international and local accounts. Although
multiple sources are used seeking to prevent bias and error, news media reports in conflict areas
provide both crucial on-the-ground information and areas for uncertainty and misinformation. The
UN and other international organizations publish reports periodically on the humanitarian situation
and events in conflict zones, which are sometimes used to verify news reports.
This chronology is then compared with the regional campaign tracker produced by the
Institute for the Study of War in order to compare acts of water weaponization with territory
controlled by the caliphate. The institute provides periodical publications of ISIS Sanctuary Maps
detailing an assessment of the organization’s control throughout Iraq and Syria. Their publications
begin in June of 2014 and the most recent was August 2019. To track the territory controlled by
the ISIL, this research turns to their Syria Situation reports and other campaign tracking reports of
Iraq and Syria which detail areas controlled by pro-regime forces, ISIL, SDF forces, Iraqi Security
forces and reconciled opposition terrain.
By connecting the acquisition and losses of these resources and acts of weaponization
through the chronology with the tracking of territory controlled within the timeframe, this paper
aims to show that the rise and decline of the ISIL caliphate in Iraq and Syria corresponds with the
number of weaponization acts and areas attacked. In doing this, this paper hopes to provide a
clearer view of how ISIL’s water weaponization coincides with their strength as a group. This
correspondence will aid in solidifying the link between climate change and terrorism.
Results and Discussion
Preceding the proclamation of a caliphate by ISIL in June 2014, declaring the Islamic State, the
insurgent group had already acquired territory and water resources. Figure 1. shows the territory
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gained by ISIL up until just before the declaration of the caliphate. In a year-long offensive starting
after the splintering of the group from Al Qaeda in 2013, ISIL sought territorial gains by fracturing
Iraqi Security Forces starting from Mosul, Iraq. 74 From Mosul, the group moved to weaken Iraqi
government control toward Baghdad, expanding operations South of Mosul to Taji, Kirkuk and
eventually to Baghdad aiming to lay the ground for an Islamic State. 75 ISIL claimed Mosul from
June 6-9, 2014 after dissolving the security forces and freeing over 3,000 prisoners from Abu
Ghraib Prison.76 The Ar-Raqqa region of Northern Syria also provided a safe haven and training
ground for ISIL seeking control of the Kurdish regions of Northern Syria.77
Key. Marking of Weaponization Acts.
Key.
-

Act of water weaponization territorial acquisition

-

Loss of water resource previously held

-

Attempt of water weaponization (brief territorial acquisition)

-

Attempt of water weaponization (no territorial acquisition)

Figure 1. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map June 10, 2014

In Figure 1. their acquisition of Fallujah, Ba’ath, Tabqa and Tishrin dams are highlighted.
ISIL captured the Tishrin Dam along the Euphrates in Manbij, Syria on November 16, 2012, their
first dam seizure while the group was still fragmented and vying for power. 78 Tishrin supplied
several Syrian towns with energy, with the capacity to produce 630 megawatts of
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hydroelectricity.79 This attack led to a Syrian government air raid to regain territory and the dam;
however, ISIL maintained control of the dam and surrounding areas.
Several months after capturing Tishrin Dam, ISIL seized the neighboring Tabqa Dam in
February 2013 and a year later, the Ba’ath Dam, both located in Ar-Raqqa, Syria (Figure 1.). This
acquisition gave much of the countryside to the militant group while government forces struggled
to retain the cities of Raqqa and Tabqa. ISIL eventually conquered the city of Raqqa in later
January 2014.80 ISIL leaked that they had controlled the provision of water services after this
acquisition by threatening the population with significant fines if the local population evaded the
water taxes or tried to steal electricity.81 Their acquisition of Tabqa Dam, the largest dam in Syria,
supplying five million people (including Aleppo) with water including irrigation for agricultural
purposes and several towns with electricity, with a max hydropower capacity of 824 megawatts,
greatly strengthened their security threat. 82 The control over this Dam gave them power over this
population. The Tabqa Dam is also strategic due to its location on Lake Assad and has been Syria’s
main source of electricity, in the past making Syria self-sufficient in power generation. 83 The
Ba’ath dam provides less hydropower, a max capacity of 81 megawatts, but supplies 60% of
Syria’s water.84

Table 2. Chronology of Water Weaponization by the ISIL within Iraq and Syria
Date
Location
Description
November 26, 2012
Manbij, Syria
ISIL rebels85 capture Tishrin
Dam
February 11, 2012
Raqqa, Syria
ISIL rebels capture Tabqa
Dam
February, 2013
Raqqa, Syria
ISIL rebels capture Ba’ath
Dam
January, 2014
Aleppo, Syria
ISIL seizes Aleppo Water
Pumping Station
April 11, 2014
Nuaimiya, Iraq
ISIL rebels capture Fallujah
Dam
June, 2014
Qaraqosh, Iraq
ISIL blocks water pipes in
Qaraqosh
June 25, 2014
Haditha, Iraq
ISIL troops advance toward
Haditha Dam
August 7, 2014
Mosul, Iraq
ISIL captures Mosul Dam
August 18, 2014
Mosul, Iraq
Kurdish troops regain control
of Mosul Dam
December, 2014
Salahaddin, Syria
ISIL contaminates drinking
water
in
Salahaddin
Governorate
January, 2015
Mosul, Iraq
ISIL attacks Mosul Dam
April, 2015
June, 2015

Samarra, Iraq
Ramadi, Iraq

ISIL attacks Samarra Dam
ISIL shuts off water flows
below the Ramadi Dam

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 7
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2021

143
9

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 7

Annika Cole
December 23, 2015

Manbij, Syria

Syrian Democratic Forces
regain control of Tishrin Dam
June 13, 2016
Fallujah, Iraq
Iraqi forces regain control of
Fallujah Dam
November 29, 2016
Mosul, Iraq
ISIL destroys water pipeline
in Mosul
December, 2016
Ramadi, Iraq
Iraqi officials announce they
have full control of Ramadi
February, 2017
Aleppo, Syria
ISIL floods fields in Aleppo to
stop the Syrian Army
March, 2017
Aleppo, Syria
Syrian Regime forces regain
water pumping station in
Aleppo
March-May 2017
Raqqa, Syria
US and Syrian forces fight
ISIL controlling Tabqa Dam
June, 2017
Raqqa, Syria
Syrian Democratic Forces
Seize Ba’ath Dam
June, 2018
Raqqa, Syria
Syrian
Government
announces reoperation of
Tabqa and Tishrin Dams
In January 2014, ISIL rebels seized one of the main water-pumping stations in Aleppo,
Syria leading to the local population being without water for two months (Figure 1.).86 This site
had previously been captured by opposition forces in February 2013.87 Their final acquisition
before the caliphate was the Fallujah Dam in Nuaimiya, Iraq on April 11, 2014 (Figure 1.) which
helps to distribute water from the Euphrates River as well as provide water for a number of
irrigation projects throughout the Anbar province. 88 ISIL captured Nuaimiya in February and
closed the gates to the dam one week before (approximately week of April 4) which reduced water
flow to the rest of Iraq’s Southern provinces.89 Insurgents reopened five gates on April 10 fearing
that the dam would flood their stronghold in Fallujah (Reuters, April 11, 2014). Iraqi officials
stated that previous flooding from the dam has already caused families to flee and had prevented
security troops from retaliating against ISIL. 90 Decline of water levels from the dam closure also
resulted in power outages (decrease from 170 megawatts to 90 megawatts) in Baghdad which
relied on steam-powered generators.91 By closing the floodgates, they diverted water over an
irrigation channel, flooding land up to 100 km away, including the city of Abu Ghraib, under up
to four meters of water.92 More than 10,000 houses and 200 square kilometers of fertile farmland,
including the annual harvest, were destroyed between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib. 93 Over 60,000
residents in the area were displaced after losing their livelihood to the flood. 94 In destroying homes,
agricultural fields and livelihood, the local population is forced to succumb to the insurgent groups’
authority or flee.

Figure 2. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map October 30, 2014
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Institute for the Study of War (2015, August 3).
In June 2014, following the declaration of the caliphate, ISIL obstructed water pipes to the
predominantly Christian town of Qaraqosh, Iraq (Figure 2.).95 They took over agricultural lands
displacing close to 50,000 inhabitants pushing them to arrive in search of safety, food and water
in Erbil.96 This action followed ISIL’s seizure of the city of Mosul on June 10, 2014 which is
nearby. The seizure of Mosul attached ISIL’s southern Dier ez-Zour and Anbar system, which was
the primary goal throughout July. 97 ISIL also maintained vast control of territory in Northeast Syria
in the Ar-Raqqa province and surrounding Aleppo continuing to hold Tishrin, Ba’ath and Tabqa
dams as well as the Aleppo Pumping Station (Figure 2.).
Later in June, Iraqi security officials reported that ISIL troops were advancing on the
Haditha Dam (Figure 2.).98 More than 2,000 Iraqi troops were deployed to the area to protect the
dam, prepared to open the floodgates if ISIL reached the dam which would cause flooding of the
town and villages and potential harm to the locals.99 Due to its attachment to Lake Qadisiyah,
which could be a potential weapon of mass destruction, US rangers seized Haditha Dam during
the 2003 invasion of Iraq to prevent Saddam Hussein’s forces from destroying it and causing an
enormous flood.100 ISIL was unable to seize the dam due to Iraqi presence; however, this would
have been a major gain if they had, as it supplied more than 30% of Iraq’s energy, particularly to
the city of Baghdad.101
ISIL captured the key facility of Mosul Dam (Figure 2.) on August 7, 2014 prompting swift
airstrikes by the Iraqi government, Kurdish and US starting on August 11. 102 The head of the
Kurdistan region’s presidency office noted that ISIL had transitioned from a terrorist organization
to a terrorist state.103 The dam can produce 1010 megawatts of electricity, 75% of Iraq’s energy
production capability and holds back 12 billion cubic meters of water which are crucial for the
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irrigation of local agriculture of the Nineveh province.104 It is estimated that a catastrophic failure
of Mosul dam could result in a flood wave of 20 meters toward the city of Mosul. 105 ISIL’s featured
their capture in their propaganda campaign and the group placed an Islamic State flag on top of
the dam declaring their victory shown in Figure 3. The Iraqi government and Kurdish forces
announced that they have fully regained control of Mosul Dam with the help of US airstrikes on
August 18, 2014 (Figure 2.).106 US airstrikes commenced on August 8 following ISIL’s capture. 107
These were the first US operations in Iraq since 2011 when they pulled out of the war in Iraq and
prompted further European involvement against the insurgent group.108
Figure 3. ISIL Propaganda featuring Mosul Dam.

Photos retrieved from UN Security Council CTED Trends Report March 2017
September and October 2014 marked ISIL’s consolidation of control over the Anbar
province of Iraq, specifically the midpoint of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha.109 This
corresponded with ISIL’s quest for the Haditha Dam (Figure 2.). The ‘Southwestern Baghdad
Belts’ had been an ISIL stronghold including Jurf al-Sakhar, Farisiyah, Fadhiliyah, Abu Ghraib,
and Amiriyat al-Fallujah; however, Iraqi Security forces were struggling to maintain control of
Amiriyat al-Fallujah which was crucial for their strength.110 Their stronghold in Mosul fell before
the June attack on Mosul dam, but it is noted that this could have been in order to preserve the
surprise of their great attack.111
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Figure 4. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map December 8, 2016

Institute for the Study of War (2016, December 6).
In October 2014, ISIL captured the city of Hit between Ramadi and Haditha, as previously
targeted, and sought to take Ramadi. 112 In December 2014, ISIL conducted simultaneous attacks
on Iraqi Security Forces in Haditha and Ramadi in their widespread ground offensive to capture
Ramadi.113 In December 2014, the UN reported that ISIL had intentionally contaminated drinking
water with crude oil in the Governorate of Salahaddin as well as in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa
(Figure 4.).114 During this time, Kurdish SDF forces pushed ISIL’s presence to the periphery of
Raqqa; however, ISIL expanded greatly in the Hasaka province and surrounding Damascus in
Syria near where the Salahaddin contamination took place. 115 ISIL also saw losses in Mosul in
January 2015 and launched another attack on Mosul Dam (Figure 4.); however, the militant group
was not able to capture the dam.116 Peshmerga soldiers and Sunni tribal groups near Mosul
prevented this attack leading ISIL to declare new governorates in nearby Jazeera and Zaab in a
defensive mobilization around Mosul. 117
Iraqi forces conducted a major offensive to take back areas around Tikrit and Baiji from
November 2014 through March 2015. 118 ISIL took partial control of the Samarra dam (also known
as Al-Thirthar dam) in Samarra, Iraq in late April 2015 (Figure 4.). 119 Iraqi forces announced an
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increased offensive to take back the Anbar province, but this attack majorly decreased their
progress.120
ISIL seized Ramadi dam (Figure 4.) in May of 2015 and weaponized this water by cutting
off pro-government towns downstream on the Euphrates River. 121 This followed ISIL’s conquest
of Ramadi which finally fell on May 27, 2015 after many months of ground attacks against Iraqi
forces (Martin, 2015). The militants manipulated the dam by only opening two or three of the
dam’s gates per day rather than the twenty-six possible.122 This lowered the depth of the river
allowing ISIL soldiers to cross and strike pro-government towns of Husaybah and Khalidiyah,
most importantly located near the Habbaniya military base. 123 Additionally, there were threats to
cut off drinking and irrigation water to the local population reportedly causing thousands to go
without drinking water in the height of the summer heat. 124 800 Iraqi federal forces were deployed
to combat ISIL following a major Iraqi government operation tasked to take back the Anbar
province, of which Ramadi is the capital. 125 There were reports of families fleeing the militants’
control; however, the reports vary from dozens to 300 families. 126
In September of 2015, Russia began its direct intervention in Syria enabling the Syrian
regime to mount renewed offensives against the caliphate. 127 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and proxy forces initiated a prolonged offensive on the city of Aleppo. 128 US backed SDF forces
also made major gains along the Syria-Iraq border in Al-Hawl and Sinjar provinces.129 The SDF
were also advancing toward the Southern Hasaka province seeking to liberate areas of the ArRaqqa province.130 On December 23, 2015 in this SDF offensive to liberate ISIL controlled towns
along the Euphrates River, the forces regained control of the Tishrin Dam (Figure 4.). 131
ISIL continued to lose terrain in Iraq and Syria throughout the early months of 2016. Iraqi
Security Forces reseized the city of Hit in the Anbar Province on April 14 as part of continual
operations to secure the Euphrates River Valley. 132 In May, ISIL lost territory in Iraq but claimed
an attack on Wilayat Sahel, on the Northwestern coast of Syria, located in regime territory. 133 ISIL
combatants initiated complex suicide attacks in deep regime territory in Tartus City and Jableh on
May 23, 2016 and indicated they were escalating assaults against Alawite communities on the
coast of Syria in order to aggravate existing sectarian tensions during the month of Ramadan. 134
On June 13, 2016 Iraqi forces regained control of the nearby Fallujah dam (Figure 4.),
which ISIL took in early 2014, following an Iraqi quest to liberate the city of Fallujah on May
23.135 ISIL also capitulated the city of Manbij and the town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province
in a chain of victories for the US-backed anti-ISIL coalition in July.136 Simultaneously, the Iraqi
Security Forces sustained conditions for future operations to retake Mosul. 137 These areas under
ISIL control in Mosul, Raqqa and Al-Bab were weakened in October by increasingly strong antiISIL operations.138 In retaliation to the encroaching Iraqi forces, on November 29, 2016 more than
650,000 Iraqis were without water in Mosul after ISIL struck one of the three major water pipelines
(Figure 4.).139 It was reported that the militant group cut electricity to the water stations feeding
neighborhoods where Iraqi troops were advancing in the operations by Iraqi Security forces to
liberate Mosul that began in October. 140

Figure 5. Institute for the Study of War ISIS Sanctuary Map August 19, 2019
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Institute for the Study of War (2019, October 12).
In late December 2016, Iraqi officials announced that they had control over Ramadi Dam
and the surrounding town (Figure 5.). 141 ISIL initiated offensives in January 2017 against the
Syrian regime in Deir ez-Zour, the Eastern Homs province, and the Eastern Damascus province,
capitalizing on the regime’s focus on Aleppo and aiming to offset or redirect regime operations
near Al-Bab.142 ISIL flooded villages in Deir Hafer Plain in East Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) in
response to a raid by the Syrian Arab Army. 143 The militant group pumped water from Assad Lake
into Al-Jar Channel.144 This advancement by the Syrian Army put them within the ISIL stronghold
of Deir Hafer for the first time since the creation of the caliphate.145 Regime forces began to chip
away at ISIL’s territorial gains in Homs province in mid-February and ISIL capitulated additional
terrain in Mosul, Iraq to the US-led anti-ISIS coalition in early 2017. 146
ISIL suffered territorial losses in Iraq and Syria between February 27 and March 9, 2017.147
Pro-regime forces reseized Palmyra, Syria with reinforcements from Iranian, Russian, and
Lebanese Hezbollah forces on March 2. 148 Pro-regime forces acquired additional towns from ISIL
in the Northeast Aleppo province between March 7 and March 9. 149 Syrian regime forces
recaptured the key water pumping station in Aleppo, Syria (Figure 5.) after inhabitants had been
without water for two months since ISIL had cut the pipeline. 150 ISIL seized the facility in January,
2014 (Figure 5.).151
In May 2017, US-backed forces continued to advance in major ISIL strongholds in Mosul,
Iraq and Raqqa, Syria. 152 Iraqi Security forced encircled the city of Mosul and US-backed SDF
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forces captured the city of Tabqa. 153 The Syrian Democratic Forces and US troops launched an
offensive in March against ISIL holding Tabqa Dam, a key source of hydroelectricity for the
caliphate.154 On May 10, 2017 reports indicated that drone footage showed the dam completely
under SDF control (Figure 5.). 155 Both Tabqa and Tishrin Dams were re-operational under the
Syrian government in June 2018 (Figure 5.). 156 NATO leaders also formally negotiated a
partnership in the Anti-ISIS Coalition in Iraq and Syria during the NATO Summit on May 25 in
Brussels, announcing that NATO will increase its "airspace management" and aerial refueling
mission for coalition aircraft and expand its deployment of special forces teams to train local ally
forces.157 As ISIL within Iraq had largely been defeated, regional actors continued to vie for
control of post-ISIL Iraqi reconstruction.158
In June of 2017, US-backed SDF forces regained control of the last dam under ISIL control,
the Ba’ath Dam (Figure 5.).159 This came within the SDF’s major offensive to take back Raqqa,
which they achieved in October of that year.160 In September, Syrian pro-regime forces continued
to attack Deir ez-Zor province with the support of heavy bombardment by the US and Russia and
also launched offensives to clear out the Iraq-Syrian border.161 This offensive from Deir ez-Zor
continued down the Euphrates river to continue liberating towns. 162 Additionally, the US AntiISIS coalition withdrew from its outpost on the Syrian-Iraqi border near Homs as part of a deconfliction agreement.163 In July 2017, a de-escalation zone in Southern Syria was brokered by the
US, Russia and Jordan.164 On October 20, the SDF declared victory over ISIL in the city of Raqqa,
Syria.165
In early 2018, Israel announced its support for the new opposition offensive against ISIL
in Syria entitled “Battle of Conquerors” and reportedly contributed cross border shelling from the
Golan Heights.166 The coalitions continued offensives against ISIL in the Deir ez-Zor province of
Syria.167 In May of 2018, Syrian pro-regime forces announced the complete control of Damascus
after the evacuation of the last remaining pocket in the capital city. 168 Additionally, the US-led
coalition launched Operation Roundup in order to “destroy IS” in Eastern Syria. 169 In December
of 2019, President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of troops from Syria and in January,
US troops were spotted removing military equipment from Northern Syria. 170 This movement
came after US troops prepared to clear the final pocket of ISIL held territory in the Deir ez-Zor
province of Syria.171 ISIL lost its last territorial zone in Syria on March 23, 2019 after it was seized
by SDF forces.172
Looking forward after the ‘defeat’ of the caliphate, it was estimated that ISIL still had over
30,000 fighters located within Iraq and Syria in August 2018 based on a report by a defense
intelligence agency. 173 After the widely successful offensives, it was presumed that ISIL
deliberately pulled back, relocating the majority of combatants and their families from Mosul,
Raqqa, and other prominent cities into new and previously known support zones in Iraq and
Syria.174 ISIL forces are now scattered across Iraq and Syria and are still an existing security
threat.175 ISIL also preserved their global finance network which enabled their ability to transition
back to an insurgency, additionally, retaining ample weaponry and other resources in alleged
tunnel systems and other support mechanisms in order to equip its revived insurgent force in the
future.176 On May 31, 2019, ISIL declared the start of a new global campaign called the ‘Battle of
Attrition’ instructing their followers to seize terrain temporarily as a way to erode their
opponents.177 ISIL has also made great strides in its ability to campaign both in Iraq and Syria and
abroad which enables it new opportunities. 178 A successful reestablishment of a physical caliphate
in Iraq and Syria could yield new surges of ISIL attacks in Europe and give the opportunity for
legitimization of ISIL’s inevitable long-term victory narrative. 179
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Conclusion
This paper explored the capacity of climate change to shift the power dynamic between nationstates and violent non-state actors within their borders. The water weaponization of ISIL in Iraq
and Syria shows the ability of manipulating water resources in a water scarce and politically
unstable environment to strengthen the role of violent non-state actors. Fourteen acts of water
weaponization were identified and chronologized along with any subsequent state actions to
reconcile these water resources. These acts of water weaponization were mapped in order to
correlate ISIL’s use of water as a weapon with the acquisition and loss of territory within their
caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Analysis of these acts showed a swell of weaponization acts before the
establishment of the caliphate and during its territorial strength from 2012 through 2015 and the
demise of both the frequency of weaponization acts and the territory held by the caliphate from
then until 2019.
These findings show a link between the effects of climate change and the increased
opportunity for violent non-state actors through the weakening of the nation-state. Furthermore,
this case shows the vulnerability of states to VNSAs while under environmental and political
stress. Although the caliphate was ‘defeated’, ISIL remains a continued security threat and the
strategy of water weaponization could be used to reestablish territorial control over other water
scarce regions. Similar tactics have been seen throughout Africa, Southeast Asia and other areas
within the Middle East, and this strategy could become widespread as climate change impacts
increase.
The offensives to take back resources acquired by ISIL through water weaponization were
enabled by the involvement of outside international actors including the US, Russia, NATO, Israel
and Iran who provided military-training, funding and weaponry to strengthen on the ground forces
in Iraq and Syria. Following the demise of the caliphate, international support withdrew and
coincided with a shift towards controlling the reconstruction of post-ISIL Iraq and Syria. The
success of the reconstruction and strengthening of these states will become a key predictor in
ISIL’s potential resurgence in the region. Additionally, as climate change effects increase, this
strategy could become widespread and used by other groups taking the lead of ISIL. The
strengthening of both central governance and authority over water infrastructure is vital for future
security and counterterrorism measures, especially in water scarce regions affected by climate
change.
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